Photos and text by Collin Mayfield. Sponsored by Qilo Tactical.

A Nigerian special forces soldier holds an RPG-7 while on patrol with the 7th Division in Borno State.

Dust hung in the sweltering morning air. Army technicals sped west on the highway from Borno State’s capital, Maiduguri. I rode in a Hilux with the 7th Division in March 2023, on a regularly scheduled anti-terror convoy, smoking menthols and drinking Nigerian energy drinks.

Borno is the epicenter of Nigeria’s decades-long Islamist insurgency. Terror groups Boko Haram and its break-away rival, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), attack civilians and the military. The conflict has killed at least 50,000 people and displaced millions. Village massacres, suicide bombings, kidnappings and executions happen periodically. Both Jihadists and security forces have destroyed hundreds of villages.

The week before my March visit, Boko Haram slaughtered 30 villagers in Mukdolo. Dozens more have been beheaded or otherwise killed on Maiduguri’s outskirts, let alone all of Borno State, in the year since. With regular attacks, violence steadily continues into 2024.

From hideout camps in their respective territories, Boko Haram and ISWAP extort and terrorize locals. They use slave labor and take hostage wives, sometimes ransoming their captives. Both groups impose taxes and cruel punishments on local villagers - practically serfs - while vying for dominance in the Lake Chad Basin.

The faces of escaped detainees displayed on a wanted poster in Maiduguri, Nigeria. 879 prisoners, some of whom were Boko Haram, ISWAP and al-Qaeda-affiliated fighters, escaped during a 2022 ISWAP attack on Kuje prison.

Boko Haram has long fallen from its 2015 peak when it controlled some 20,000 square miles in the Chad Basin. Now, the group holds limited territory in Sambisa and Alargarno Forests. ISWAP controls much more territory, with its epicenter in the marshes and islands of Lake Chad.

In highway-accessible communities, frequent patrols keep militants at bay. The Army also conducts search-and-destroy missions to destroy insurgent hideouts, capture weapons and free hostages. Meanwhile, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) conducts airstrikes on bush hideouts - killing insurgents and destroying equipment.

After speaking to Brig. General Ibrahim at a Maiduguri Garrison, my fixer Hamza and I secured seats in a technical. The roughly dozen trucks left that morning, each equipped with heavy machine guns - most often Soviet DShKs or American Brownings. Soldiers equipped with worn-out AKs, PKMs or RPGs rode on the trucks’ sides, with men in the truck beds on the machine guns.

Nigerian soldiers ride in a technical equipped with a DShK.

The military won’t stop for checkpoints or traffic. The convoy sped off-road, trailed by red dust, or drove in the oncoming lane to bypass congestion. The technicals pulled off at a designated rendezvous - a large tree near Kesawa Town - and met other trucks.

Hamza and I were as far as Gen. Ibrahim authorized us to go, so we rode a lone technical the few hours back to Maiduguri. The military has restricted press after a Reuters investigation alleged forced abortions and other human rights abuses by the Nigerian Army (which they deny). The report claims the Army gave injections or abortion pills, under the guise of other medications, to women who had been kidnapped and raped by insurgents - terminating at least 10,000 pregnancies.

Enter Maiduguri

No one would sell me, a white Westerner, a bus ticket through Nigeria’s north for fear of kidnapping. Instead, I booked a flight from the capital Abuja to Maiduguri. Airport security wanted to confiscate my body armor, suspicious of me bringing it to insurgent-filled Borno. After convincing their superior that my reasons were legitimate, I flew to Maiduguri. Only one other Westerner, an Italian UN worker, was on the flight. Journalist Hamza Sulieman, my fixer and guide in Borno State, waited at the airport.

Maiduguri is a city on lockdown. Technicals patrol checkpoint-laden streets. Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) buildings sit throughout the city. With two insurgent groups in the surrounding bush, security is tight. Maiduguri has faced dozens of terror attacks.

A sign reading “Borno home of peace, Islam is for peace, Shariah is Islam” on the outskirts of Maiduguri.

Yet Maiduguri remains a lively city with packed markets, restaurants and modern shops. There’s even amazing nightlife - if you know where to look. Few liquor stores and no bars sit in this ultra-conservative corner of the world. Luxury hotels fill that void. I stayed in the mostly-empty Grand Pinnacle Hotel - gated and staffed by a policeman named Clement.

Police officer Clement James posted at the Grand Pinnacle Hotel.

Most nights, the hotel hosts massive pool-side parties with a stocked bar. During my stay, hundreds of Maiduguri residents partied at the Grand Pinnacle. Colored strobe lights reflected off the pool while music blared. Rema’s hit “Calm Down” played at least twice. Nigerians seemed proud of the song.

Women wore Western clothes, hair uncovered, instead of Maiduguri’s usual abayas and hijabs. Vendors shoved through partiers to sell cigarettes and cheap cigars that I smoked far too many of. Alcohol was abundant; hundreds of empty lager bottles filled trash cans. The party carried into the morning, and I stayed late to enjoy the drinks, smokes and haram atmosphere instead of trying to sleep through the almost nightly revelry.

But a quick drive from the Grand Pinnacle Hotel is Maiduguri’s Muna Camp - a cramped shantytown of thatch and tarp huts with some 51,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The war in Borno has displaced some 2.5 million displaced civilians. The majority live in camps like Muna.

Despite being Maiduguri’s largest IDP camp, Muna is not government-recognized. The camp receives no federal or state funding. However, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) provides food aid, though those foodstuffs aren’t always sufficient. Famished IDPs venture back into the militant-infested bush to hunt, tend crops and gather firewood. Boko Haram has killed those who’ve returned for wood and foodstuffs, and it has also attacked IDP camps with suicide bombers and thrown grenades into huts.

Groups like USAID and the Red Crescent (Red Cross) provide Muna with aid. In 2022, the Red Crescent started classes on epidemic prevention through proper sanitation. Diseases like meningitis, measles and cholera are Muna Camp’s leading killers. However, Muna’s biggest threat is fire. Homes are thatch, and residents cook over fires. Despite causing no deaths, one fire destroyed about 200 huts in February 2023. Another fire last November killed two IDPs and destroyed over 1000 huts.

Borno’s civilian population faces violence from not only Jihadists but also government forces. Forced abortions aside, the military is accused of summary executions, forced displacement and torture. One soldier showed me a video of his comrades torturing an alleged terrorist; soldiers bound the man’s hands behind his back and suspended him from his wrists, dislocating his shoulders.

Allegedly, Nigerian troops have indiscriminately targeted civilians through a scorched-earth campaign. Clearance operations burn homes, while the military confiscates food and livestock to keep them from insurgents. Air bombings often kill civilians. The military allegedly views those who remain in the bush instead of having fled to government-held cities as having Jihadist sympathies.

Some soldiers privately condemned these human rights abuses to me while they simultaneously claimed abuses were less common than the media reports.

A ‘USAID’ and “Danish Refugee Council (DRC)” sign in Muna Camp.

Rise of Boko Haram

The rubble of the Markas mosque now sits in a Maiduguri garbage patch. Here in 2002, fundamentalist preacher Mohammad Yusef founded a new Salafi group called Jama’atu Ahl al-Sunnah lil-Dawa wal-Jihad (JAS, “People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad”), better known by its moniker Boko Haram (“Western education is haram”). Barely protruding from the trash, only a few blue-painted cinder blocks remain from Boko Haram’s birthplace. The government destroyed the mosque in 2009.

The rubble of the Markas mosque in Maiduguri.

Yusef rejected secularism, especially Western education, and tried to destroy Shia Islam (and Sufism) in Nigeria. He condemned nationalism as sin, denied evolution and claimed the Earth was flat. The Qur’an, Yusef claimed, was the only book worth reading. Impoverished families studied in his madrasa, where he radicalized more followers.

Despite minor clashes with the army in 2003, Boko Haram mainly remained dormant. Fighting erupted in 2009 when members and police clashed over motorcycle helmet laws. Then, the army raided Yusef’s strongholds in Borno State, particularly in Maiduguri, and killed some 700 Boko Haram militants. The army captured Yusef, who died in police custody.

After Yusef died, his close lieutenant Mamman Nur vanished. Nur may have been in Sudan or Somalia, creating links to other militant groups - including al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Abubakar Shekau succeeded Yusef and grew in power in Nur’s absence. Shekau drastically escalated violence. Alleged cooperation with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) increased the frequency, sophistication and deadliness of Boko Haram attacks. Shekau often used children, especially girls, as suicide bombers. He zealously accused dissenters of takfir - when one Muslim excommunicates another for apostasy.

Mohammad Babagana, whom I met in Maiduguri, was a former Boko Haram medical officer who treated Shekau’s battle wounds. Babagana’s men looted supplies from medical clinics. He described Shekau as quick to anger. “Shekau did not have any sicknesses, but if he was frustrated Shekau used to chew his tongue, and then blood would come out of his mouth,” Babagana said.

Former Boko Haram medical officer Mohammad Babagana in Maiduguri.

Babagana surrendered to the government through an ongoing amnesty program. He lived freely in Maiduguri alongside ‘reformed’ Boko Haram commandants Babagana Ali Ajabal and Bakura Musa. Ajabal was an armored vehicle commander, and Musa was a munzim - a bomb maker and strategist. The three were among Shekau’s top lieutenants, having worked with him closely.

“I made suicide vests and all sorts of bombs,” explained Bakura Musa in Maiduguri. “My role in Boko Haram was a *munzim* - the commandant of bomb formation, bomb detonation - or anything other [involving] bombs or suicide vests. I was the superior *munzim* in Sambisa Forest.”

The three claimed repentance and defected to fight alongside government forces within the Borno State Vigilante Association. Former terrorists have valuable insights, and the military needs all the help it can get.

The Vigilante Association raids Sambisa Forest two or three times almost weekly. The fighters attack their former Boko Haram comrades and hand captured weapons to the army.

A Borno State Vigilante Association truck.

“Now, we only go into the bush to fight our former comrades and capture their ammunition, we kill them, recover their vehicles and give them to the government,” explained Babagana Ali Ajabal, a former Boko Haram armored vehicle commander.

Escalation in Violence

When Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian, was inaugurated president in 2011, Boko Haram launched successive bombings across Nigeria, especially attacking the capital, Abuja. Their deadliest bombing targeted the Abuja United Nations building. A car broke through security barriers before the driver detonated in a UN reception area, killing 21 and injuring 73 before the targeted wing collapsed.

The Department of State Services (DSS) immediately searched for the UN bombing’s perpetrators. Mohammed Usman was arrested for his involvement in 2016. Others involved, like commandant Musa, escaped arrest, though the munzim took amnesty in 2021.

President Jonathan declared a state of emergency and vowed to suppress the insurgents, prompting retaliatory massacres from Boko Haram.

Commanders Khalid al-Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kambar, associates of Yusef, criticized Shekau’s bloodlust, citing his killing of innocent Muslims, eagerness to behead and coercion of young girls into suicide bombings. Shekau was too quick to declare takfir, al-Barnawi and Kambar claimed, and Shekau arrogantly demanded to be called “the Greatest Imam.”

Al-Barnawi and Kambar instead wanted to attack Westerners and high-profile government targets. They further criticized Boko Haram’s focus on Nigeria alone, instead urging Jihad across the Sahel. In 2012, the commanders split off and formed Ansaru - Jamāʿatu Anṣāril Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān, the Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa.

Most fighters remained loyal to Shekau, so Ansaru’s rebellion was defeated. Outgunned, Ansaru fled to Algeria and Somalia to shelter with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabaab, respectively. They became more sophisticated with al-Qaeda training.

Despite the schism, Boko Haram continued attacks and expanded its grasp into neighboring Cameroon through 2013; the group often retreated into Cameroon’s mountainous borderlands to escape Nigerian forces.

In April 2014, Shekau caught international ire when Boko Haram kidnapped 276 children from a girls’ school in Chibok, Borno. In a video release, he said the girls converted to ‘true’ Islam and were married to his fighters. God instructed him to take the girls, Shekau claimed, the enslavement of infidels was permitted and the children were of marriage age. Boko Haram kidnapped about 100 other women and girls across the Chad Basin in the aftermath of the Chibok Kidnapping.

Responding to the horrific incident, Michelle Obama heroically tweeted a photo of herself holding a sign that read “#BringBackOurGirls” in the East Wing of the White House.

Nigeria’s military immediately launched rescue operations, but Shekau’s men ambushed army convoys. Boko Haram killed 58 soldiers and civilians in an attack on Buni Yadi, and 310 civilians were massacred overnight in Gamboru Ngala. A second Chibok attack killed 51, including some parents of the original Chibok girls.

Musa orchestrated a bombing that killed 56 in a Maiduguri market. “I am the one who made the bombs and set them off,” he explained. Another of his bombs killed 120 at Kano’s Central Mosque, far removed from Borno.

Needing more supplies by May, Boko Haram raided a construction camp across the border in Waza, Cameroon. Ajabal captured more trucks, Musa obtained mining explosives and hostages were taken.

“When we attacked Waza we seized many hiluxes full of explosive supplies,” explained Musa. “We succeeded in capturing 10 expatriates - Chinese workers - with the mining company.”

Thousands of famished refugees fled into Cameroon. After Boko Haram captured the Nigerian border town Gwoza was captured by Boko Haram in August 2014, Cameroonian President Paul Biya upended military leadership and ordered 1000 additional troops to the border.

About 200 Boko Haram fighters attacked the Cameroonian Deputy Prime Minister Amadou Ali’s home in July. 15 were killed while Ali’s wife, the Sultan of Kolofata and his family, and staff were kidnapped. Ali’s wife was released with the 10 Chinese workers and 16 other captives that October.

The Cameroonian government denies paying a ransom, but Musa told me the captives fetched a heavy price. “For each captive, we received 2 billion Naira (about US $1,500,000),” he said.

Shekau’s Caliphate expanded, but Boko Haram failed to capture Maiduguri itself. At its 2015 height, Boko Haram controlled about 20,000 square miles in northeastern Nigeria and neighboring parts of Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

Most Chibok girls have now been saved, though 96 remain missing. They’ve been found years later as the captive wives of and child-bearers of Boko Haram.

The West African Offensive

Nigeria’s National Joint Task Force (NJTF), implemented by the 90s dictatorship to suppress Sahelian bandits, expanded with the additions of Chad and Niger to the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and a new mandate of counter-terrorism. Benin and Cameroon joined soon after. The African Union approved international military action in January 2015, beginning the West African Offensive. 7500 additional troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger aided Nigeria against Boko Haram.

After days of airstrikes in February, a Chadian incursion captured Gamboru Town, killing 200 militants. Boko Haram retaliated with a cross-border raid that killed 81 civilians and 19 Chadian and Cameroonian troops. Punitive attacks torched dozens of villages; Boko Haram kidnapped and slaughtered civilians before being forced back by coalition troops.

The combined air and ground forces of Chad and Niger caused Boko Haram to forfeit a dozen villages, after which Boko Haram massacred over 100 civilians in villages in Chad and Nigeria. Hundreds of Shekau’s fighters were killed fighting the coalition, which continued to capture strategic towns held by the Jihadists.

Mamman Nur meanwhile rejoined Boko Haram in Sambisa Forest in 2014 or 2015. As the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) swiftly captured Levantine territory, and Boko Haram was losing to the African Coalition, Nur and other commanders pushed Shekau to align with ISIS.

In March 2015 the self-declared “Greatest Imam” begrudgingly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and its Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Boko Haram became the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). “There was a time when we swore allegiance to Caliph al-Bagdhadi in Iraq. So he sent us money and all the necessary support,” Musa explained.

Islamic State affiliation provided support against the coalition and IS encouraged West Africans to join Boko Haram or similar groups. African fighters received training in Iraq and Syria while Shekau improved his standing on the international Jihadist scene. Several Ansaru commanders defected back to Boko Haram.

But Islamic State affiliation didn’t save Boko Haram. By the end of March, roughly 2,000 Nigerian and Chadian troops liberated Damasak Town and killed over 200 Boko Haram fighters. Coalition troops quickly uncovered the mass graves of about 400 executed civilians, murdered by Boko Haram in retaliation for attempting to join self-defense militias. Many victims were beheaded underneath a concrete bridge on town outskirts. The Sahelian air mummified their bodies.

Shekau lost his capital Gwoza to Nigerian troops days later. He ordered the executions of civilians who refused, or were unable, to defend Gwoza. Meanwhile, Chadian and Nigerian airstrikes forced Boko Haram from more towns.

By April 2015, Shekau had lost most of his territory. Boko Haram retreated into the bush, especially its stronghold Sambisa Forest. Nigerian forces subsequently destroyed dozens of hidden bases, emancipating nearly 700 women and children. Improvised explosives and booby traps slowed army progress.

Boko Haram survived inside Sambisa Forest, and despite the group’s weakened state, violence continued with suicide bombings, IEDs, village raids and military ambushes.

“There was not any downtime in Sambisa,” explained Ajabal. “In the morning we would recite our Islamic books. After this, we went to our duty areas. We also had specific trainings. There was one man from Mali who came and taught us to use different guns. There was no time to stay idle. There was time for prayer, time for studies, time for training, time at your duty post and time to see your family.”

Schisms Among Jihadists and the Rise of the Islamic State

By 2016, Shekau had lost Islamic State support. He was too bloody for even ISIS, which ironically disliked his beheadings of Muslims and blowing up school girls. Nur and Abu Musab al-Barnawi, likely the son of Mohammad Yusef, challenged Shekau’s command. The Islamic State determined Shekau was unfit to lead its West African Province, and al-Barnawi became ISWAP’s commander. An estimated 1,500 militants, including Ajabal, Babagana and Musa, remained with Shekau under Boko Haram’s original name. Barnawi’s roughly 3,500 followers remained the Islamic State West Africa Province.

In 2016, ISWAP attacked the Nigerian garrison in Bosso, its first solo attack. Al-Barnawi’s men stole weapons and gear while avoiding civilian casualties.

Shekau never renounced his Islamic State allegiance but refused to recognize al-Barnawi, claiming that the Boko Haram-ISWAP fighting was an internal matter. In a video release, Shekau claimed that he remained the top Jihadist and said the Islamic State was wrong in backing al-Barnawi’s faction. However, with their victory at the Bosso garrison and official IS support, ISWAP was on the rise.

Skirmishes occurred throughout 2016, but fighting calmed briefly before resuming in 2017. Boko Haram often kidnapped civilians from ISWAP territory because Shekau claimed ‘infidels’ outside of his territory were fair targets. He also wrote the Islamic State and claimed that al-Barnawi was not a true Salafist. ISWAP condemned Shekau and called for his removal, though IS never commented and likely attempted to reconcile the two.

Mamman Nur was executed by ISWAP in 2018, likely because Nur and other ISWAP members participated in Swiss-mediated peace talks with the Nigerian government. Hardliners wanted to continue the fight. After Nur’s death, ISWAP became more militant. The group mostly focused on attacking and looting military targets. ISWAP seldom killed civilians and didn’t use women or children for suicide bombings, though they did kidnap children. Al-Barnawi stepped down from ISWAP command in 2019, presumably because of his young age.

However, anti-terror efforts mainly focused on Shekau’s faction, as Boko Haram, not ISWAP, was the bloodier, more infamous group. Boko Haram’s village raids and suicide bombings continued in civilian areas.

To counter the rising ISWAP, Shekau revamped attacks to reassert his dominance. Kidnapped young boys bolstered militant numbers, so the Army pushed to relocate civilians to fortified towns. Boko Haram reclaimed the countryside, and the military treated civilians who remained with suspicion.

The MNJTF renewed operations in 2019. Troops from Chad entered Borno State. ISWAP’s attacks on military targets, rather than civilians, caused a significant drop in civilian deaths while fatalities rose among government forces.

Whereas Boko Haram has massacred hundreds of Muslim civilians, the Islamic State has provided its ‘citizens’ services previously neglected by the government. ISWAP has suppressed banditry and cattle rustling, dug wells and provided villagers with (extremely limited) medical care. Despite heavy taxation and cruel punishments like chopping off hands, ISWAP has garnered at least some local support. The now-defeated Islamic State in Iraq and Syria claims ISWAP victories, territory and public services as its own.

Boko Haram was crippled by coalition forces while ISWAP was stronger than ever. In 2021, ISWAP confirmed that al-Barnawi regained leadership. Back in power and possibly with authorization from the Islamic State’s central command, al-Barnawi ordered his fighters to eliminate Shekau. Boko Haram was devastated in the subsequent Battle of Sambisa Forest.

Late the night of April 14, ISWAP troops snuck through the forest, tediously avoiding landmines and IEDs. They knew Sambisa well, as many were former Boko Haram. The next morning, ISWAP launched a surprise attack on Shekau’s base with tactics learned from the IS like vehicle-born suicide bombers and modified civilian drones.

Boko Haram responded with mortars and suicide bombers, but ISWAP sharpshooters killed most suicide bombers before they could reach ISWAP lines. Only three Boko Haram suicide bombers hit enemy targets. Ajabal’s men attempted to repel ISWAP with technicals and armored vehicles.

Despite heavy resistance, ISWAP secured Boko Haram’s main base. Shekau eluded capture as several of his fighters surrendered. The next day, ISWAP technicals and motorcycles (with mounted machine guns) hunted down the remaining Boko Haram.

Shekau’s last khutbah (public sermon) was on April 18. He reiterated his ideology and defiance, refusing to yield. The next afternoon, ISWAP surrounded Shekau and his remaining fighters. As his enemy was closing in and some of his fighters attempted to negotiate a surrender, Shekau blew himself up with a suicide vest, killing a few ISWAP fighters. Boko Haram loyalist Bakura Sa'alaba confirmed Shekau’s death, but other Boko Haram claim Shekau still lives.

Ajabal, Babagana and Musa escaped ISWAP’s grasp before surrendering to government troops. The three men abandoned their livestock in Sambisa Forest - Boko Haram holdouts would kill them before allowing those foodstuffs to leave the bush.

“When coming out to surrender to the government we left all our livestock, foodstuffs and resources because if we tried to take them there would be fighting with the other Boko Haram who wanted to stay in the bush,” explained Ajabal. “It would be do or die.”

The ISWAP accepted Boko Haram surrenders, instead of executing them as Boko Haram would have done with enemy captives. Al-Barnawi said ISWAP was only opposed to Shekau, so disarmed Boko Haram were proselytized and released. This changed the sympathies of many Boko Haram fighters.

ISWAP attempted to reconcile with and absorb remnants of Boko Haram, but Shekau’s successor Doron Bakura refused. The two rivals fought again in Sambisa Forest. Boko Haram attacked an ISWAP base and kidnapped 33 IS wives. A surprise attack on an ISWAP armory killed an unknown number of fighters, and another raid left 33 ISWAP wives dead. The Islamic State retaliated last July, killing at least 50 Boko Haram men, women and children. Another 41, from both groups, were killed in August clashes.

Infighting continues today, and ISWAP and Boko Haram remain subject to attacks from one another. The military, and its auxiliary militias, continue battling both insurgent groups. Despite their schism, government forces make little distinction between the two but recognize that infighting weakens both groups.

The Fight Ahead

The military’s regular clearance operations continue making progress against the insurgents, despite some humanitarian concerns, rescuing hostage wives and slaves. Nigerian forces rescued 25 Boko Haram hostages during operations last August.

Yet the Army suffers from logistical and command issues, making it difficult to defeat the insurgents finally. Troops are poorly supplied with minimal gear and bases lack security. Troop rotation is infrequent, resulting in exhausted frontline soldiers. Field medical facilities are badly equipped. Some soldiers allege poor command and impune officers. Corruption further hinders progress, such as when a former soldier was arrested for supplying weapons to Boko Haram.

Military contingents also lack coordination, such as poor interoperability between the Air Force and the Army. Despite air superiority, air support is often hard to come by. The MNJTF likewise acts incoherently. Coalition troops rarely cross their neighbors' borders, meaning insurgents escape across porous borders. Likewise, distrust exists between Nigeria and the other MNJTF member states.

The appointment of Lieutenant General Lagbaja as the new Chief of Army Staff in June 2023 gave some optimism. “We‘re determined to address challenges confronting soldiers in the North East,” said Lagbaja during an operational visit to Borno.

Amnesty for former insurgents has proved ineffective, with many ‘reformed Jihadists’ maintaining terrorist affiliations. Babagana Ali Ajabal, whom I met in Maiduguri, secretly remained a member of Boko Haram despite his claims of repentance. Ajabal entered Cameroon to meet a gun runner and transport weapons to Boko Haram remnants in Sambisa Forest.

The Nigerian Army, along with surrendered fighters Babagana and Musa, arrested Ajabal last September. After further interrogation, Nigerian authorities determined that Ajabal was working with several other Boko Haram members, providing intelligence and weapons to Boko Haram.

When I met him, Ajabal was not sorrowful for his role in Boko Haram but was instead bitter toward the government.

“They promised us that if we surrendered and put down our arms, they would take care of our needs,” said Ajabal. “The government said it would compensate us for all that we had in the forest. We were promised houses and startup capital to start businesses. The government has not kept its promise, and we are struggling to survive, struggling to eat. We were promised so much that we have not gotten.”

Despite not having been summarily executed by the army or sitting in an overcrowded prison at the time we met, Ajabal wanted more from the government.

“We go deep into Sambisa, go to Boko Haram armories, capture their weapons, ammunition and bombs … and bring them back to the Nigerian Army. We would go in and kill those who were still in Boko Haram. But we were left empty-handed,” said Ajabal. “We must do what is best for ourselves - maybe return to Boko Haram.”

If I had met Ajabal outside of Maiduguri, I wonder if my neck would still be intact.

Other former Jihadists likely believe returning to their comrades in the bush would be a better life than serving the government. As violence in Borno State shows little chance of abating, the bloodshed will continue.“Many hardened commanders and thousands of experienced fighters remain fighting in the bush,” said Mohammad Babagana. “There is much the government must do to finally end this war.”

Follow more of my reporting on my Instagram @collin_mayfield. Special thanks to Bianca Bridger for helping me write this story.

The Borno Insurgency